Multiculturalism is closely associated with “identity politics,” “the politics of difference,” and “the politics of recognition,” all of which share a commitment to revaluing disrespected identities and changing dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain groups (Gutmann 2003, Taylor 1992, Young 1990). Multiculturalism involves not only claims of identity and culture as some critics of multiculturalism suggest. It is also a matter of economic interests and political power: it includes demands for remedying economic and political disadvantages that people suffer as a result of their marginalized group identities.
Multiculturalists take for granted that it is “culture” and “cultural groups” that are to be recognized and accommodated. Yet multicultural claims include a wide range of claims involving religion, language, ethnicity, nationality, and race. Culture is a contested, open-ended concept, and all of these categories have been subsumed by or equated with the concept of culture. Disaggregating and distinguishing among different types of claims can clarify what is at stake (Song 2008). Language and religion are at the heart of many claims for cultural accommodation by immigrants. The key claim made by minority nations is for self-government rights. Race has a more limited role in multicultural discourse. Antiracism and multiculturalism are distinct but related ideas: the former highlights “victimization and resistance” whereas the latter highlights “cultural life, cultural expression, achievements, and the like” (Blum 1992, 14). Claims for recognition in the context of multicultural education are demands not just for recognition of aspects of a group's actual culture (e.g. African American art and literature) but also for acknowledgment of the history of group subordination and its concomitant experience (Gooding-Williams 1998).
Examples of cultural accommodations or “group-differentiated rights” include exemptions from generally applicable law (e.g. religious exemptions), assistance to do things that the majority can do unassisted (e.g. multilingual ballots, funding for minority language schools and ethnic associations, affirmative action), representation of minorities in government bodies (e.g. ethnic quotas for party lists or legislative seats, minority-majority Congressional districts), recognition of traditional legal codes by the dominant legal system (e.g. granting jurisdiction over family law to religious courts), or limited self-government rights (e.g. qualified recognition of tribal sovereignty, federal arrangements recognizing the political autonomy of Québec) (for a helpful classification of cultural rights, see Levy 1997).
Typically, a group-differentiated right is a right of a minority group (or a member of such a group) to act or not act in a certain way in accordance with their religious obligations and/or cultural commitments. In some cases, it is a right that directly restricts the freedom of non-members in order to protect the minority group's culture, as in the case of restrictions on the use of the English language in Québec. When the right-holder is the group, the right may protect group rules that restrict the freedom of individual members, as in the case of the Pueblo membership rule that excludes the children of women who marry outside the group. Now that you have a sense of the kinds of claims that have been made in the name of multiculturalism, we can now turn to consider different normative justifications for these claims.
One justification for multiculturalism arises out of the communitarian critique of liberalism. Liberals tend to be ethical individualists; they insist that individuals should be free to choose and pursue their own conceptions of the good life. They give primacy to individual rights and liberties over community life and collective goods. Some liberals are also individualists when it comes to social ontology (what some call methodological individualism or atomism). Methodological individualists believe that you can and should account for social actions and social goods in terms of the properties of the constituent individuals and individual goods. The target of the communitarian critique of liberalism is not so much liberal ethics as liberal social ontology. Communitarians reject the idea that the individual is prior to the community and that the value of social goods can be reduced to their contribution to individual well-being. They instead embrace ontological holism, which acknowledges collective goods as, in Charles Taylor's words, “irreducibly social”and intrinsically valuable (Taylor 1995).
An ontologically holist view of collective identities and cultures underlies Taylor's argument for a “politics of recognition.” Drawing on Rousseau, Herder, and Hegel, among others, Taylor argues that we do not become full human agents and define our identity in isolation from others; rather, “we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us” (1994, 33). Because our identities are formed dialogically, we are dependent on the recognition of others. The absence of recognition or mis-recognition can cause serious injury: “A person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (25). The struggle for recognition can only be satisfactorily resolved through “a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals“ (50). Taylor distinguishes the politics of recognition from the traditional liberal “politics of equal respect” that is “inhospitable to difference, because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals” (60). By contrast, the politics of recognition is grounded on “judgments about what makes a good life—judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an important place” (61). He discusses the example of the survival of French culture in Quebec. The French language is not merely a collective resource that individuals might want to make use of and thereby seek to preserve, as suggested by a politics of equal respect. Instead, the French language is an irreducibly collective good that itself deserves to be preserved: language policies aimed at preserving the French language in Québec “actively seek to create members of the community” by assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers (58). Because of the indispensable role of cultures in the development human agency and identity, Taylor argues, we should adopt the presumption of the equal worth of all cultures (66).
A second justification for multiculturalism comes from within liberalism but a liberalism that has been revised through critical engagement with the communitarian critique of liberalism. Will Kymlicka has developed the most influential liberal theory of multiculturalism by marrying the liberal values of autonomy and equality with an argument about the value of cultural membership (1989, 1995, 2001). Rather than beginning with intrinsically valuable collective goals and goods as Taylor does, Kymlicka views cultures as instrumentally valuable to individuals, for two main reasons. First, cultural membership is an important condition of personal autonomy. In his first book, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989), Kymlicka develops his case for multiculturalism within a Rawlsian framework of justice, viewing cultural membership as a “primary good,” things that every rational person is presumed to want and which are necessary for the pursuit of one's goals (Rawls 1971, 62). In his later book, Multicultural Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka drops the Rawlsian scaffolding, relying instead on the work of Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz on national self-determination (1990). One important condition of autonomy is having an adequate range of options from which to choose (Raz 1986). Cultures serve as "contexts of choice," which provide meaningful options and scripts with which people can frame, revise, and pursue their goals (Kymlicka 1995, 89). Second, cultural membership plays an important role in people's self-identity. Citing Margalit and Raz as well as Taylor, Kymlicka views cultural identity as providing people with an “anchor for their self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging” (1995, 89, quoting Margalit and Raz 1990, 448 and also citing Taylor 1992). This means there is a deep and general connection between a person's self-respect and the respect accorded to the cultural group of which she is a part. It is not simply membership in any culture but one's own culture that must be secured in order for cultural membership to serve as a meaningful context of choice and a basis of self-respect.
Kymlicka moves from these premises about the instrumental value of cultural membership to the egalitarian claim that because members of minority groups are disadvantaged in terms of access to their own cultures (in contrast to members of the majority culture), they are entitled to special protections. It is important to note that Kymlicka's egalitarian argument for multiculturalism rests on a theory of equality that critics have dubbed “luck egalitarianism” (Anderson 1999, Scheffler 2003). According to luck egalitarians, individuals should be held responsible for inequalities resulting from their own choices, but not for inequalities deriving from unchosen circumstances (Dworkin 1981; Rakowski 1993). The latter inequalities are the collective responsibility of citizens to address. For example, inequalities stemming from one's social starting position in life are unchosen yet so strongly determine our prospects in life. Luck egalitarians argue that those born into poor families are entitled to collective support and assistance via a redistributive tax scheme. Kymlicka adds cultural membership to this list of unchosen inequalities. If one is born into the dominant culture of society, one enjoys good brute luck, whereas those who belong to minority cultures suffer disadvantages in virtue of the bad brute luck of their minority status. Insofar as inequality in access to cultural membership stems from luck (as opposed to individual choices) and one suffers disadvantages as a result of it, members of minority groups can reasonably demand that members of the majority culture must share in bearing the costs of accommodation. Minority group rights are justified, as Kymlicka argues, “within a liberal egalitarian theory…which emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities” (Kymlicka 1995, 109).
One might question whether cultural minority groups really are “disadvantaged” and thereby, owed positive accommodations. Why not just enforce antidiscrimination laws, stopping short of any positive accommodations for minority groups? Kymlicka and other liberal theorists of multiculturalism contend that antidiscrimination laws fall short of treating members of minority groups as equals; this is because states cannot be neutral with respect to culture. In culturally diverse societies, we can easily find patterns of state support for some cultural groups over others. While states may prohibit racial discrimination and avoid official establishment of any religion, they cannot avoid establishing one language for public schooling and other state services (language being a paradigmatic marker of culture) (Kymlicka 1995, 111; Carens 2000, 77–78; Patten 2001, 693). Linguistic advantage translates into economic and political advantage since members of the dominant cultural community have a leg up in schools, the workplace, and politics. Linguistic advantage also takes a symbolic form. When state action extends symbolic affirmation to some groups and not others by adopting a particular language or by organizing the work week and public holidays around the calendar of particular religions, it has a normalizing effect, suggesting that one group's language and customs are more valued than those of other groups.
In addition to state support of certain cultures over others, state laws may place constraints on some cultural groups over others. Consider the case of dress code regulations in public schools or the workplace. A ban on religious dress burdens religious individuals, as in the case of Simcha Goldman, a U.S. Air Force officer, who was also an ordained rabbi and wished to wear a yarmulke out of respect to an omnipresent God (Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986)). The case of the French state's ban on religious dress in public schools, which burdens Muslim girls who wish to wear headscarves to school, is another example (Bowen 2007, Laborde 2008). Religion may command that believers dress in a certain way (what Peter Jones calls an “intrinsic burden”), not that believers refrain from attending school or going to work (Jones 1994). Yet, burdens on believers do not stem from the dictates of religion alone; they also arise from the intersection of the demands of religion and the demands of the state (“extrinsic burden”). Individuals must bear intrinsic burdens themselves; bearing the burdens of the dictates of one's faith, such as prayer, worship, and fasting, just is part of meeting one's religious obligations. When it comes to extrinsic burdens, however, liberal multiculturalists argue that justice requires assisting cultural minorities bear the burdens of these unchosen disadvantages.
It is important to note that liberal multiculturalists distinguish among different types of groups. For instance, Kymlicka's theory develops a typology of different groups and different types of rights for each. It offers the strongest form of group-differentiated rights—self-government rights—to indigenous peoples and national minorities for the luck egalitarian reason that their minority status is unchosen: they were coercively incorporated into the larger state. By contrast, immigrants are viewed as voluntary migrants: by choosing to migrate, they relinquished access to their native culture. Immigrant multiculturalism, what Kymlicka calls “polyethnic rights”, is understood as a demand for fairer terms of integration into the broader society through the granting of exemptions and accommodations, not a rejection of integration or a demand for collective self-determination (1995, 113–115).
Another argument for multiculturalism begins from the value of freedom from domination. One might value freedom from domination because one is attracted to the doctrine of civic republicanism as developed by Phillip Pettit (1997) and Quentin Skinner (1998), or one might value it because one holds that domination presents a serious obstacle to human flourishing (Lovett 2009). In contrast to the conception of freedom as non-interference dominant in liberal theory, freedom as non-domination, drawn from the civic republic tradition, focuses on a person's “capacity to interfere, on an arbitrary basis, in certain choices that the other is in a position to make” (Pettit 1997, 52). On this view of freedom, we can be unfree even when we are not experiencing any interference as in the case of a slave of a benevolent master. We are subject to domination to the extent that we are dependent on another person or group holding some measure of arbitrary power over us (Pettit 1997, ch. 2).
Frank Lovett has explored the implications of the value of freedom from domination for questions of multicultural accommodation (2010). He begins from the premise that freedom from domination is an important human good and that we have a prima facie obligation to reduce domination. He argues that the state should not accommodate social practices that directly involve domination; indeed, if freedom from domination is a priority, then one should “aim to bring such practices to an end as quickly as possible, despite any subjective value they happen to have for their participants” (2010, 256). As for practices that do not involve subjecting individuals to domination, accommodation is permissible but not necessarily required. Accommodation is only required if accommodation would advance the goal of reducing domination. He discusses one stylized example based on a familiar real-world case: the practice among Muslim women and girls of wearing headscarves. Suppose, Lovett suggests, a detailed study of a particular Muslim community in a liberal democratic society is undertaken and it reveals that women's educational and employment opportunities are discouraged, generating “severe patriarchal domination,” but the study also shows that the practice of wearing headscarves does not (2010, 258). Lovett argues that the practice of wearing headscarves should be accommodated because failure to do so might strengthen the community's commitment to other shared practices that reinforce patriarchal domination. A key empirical assumption here is that combating patriarchal practices within minority communities would be easier if the burdens on more benign practices, such as wearing headscarves, are lessened. Cecile Laborde's analysis of the headscarf controversy in France provides support for this assumption: the effect of preventing Muslim girls from wearing headscarves is to encourage their parents to withdraw their daughters from civic education and send them to religious schools where they would not be exposed to the diversity of world views found in public schools. Formal restrictions on Muslim religious expression in the public sphere may make, in Laborde's words, “members of dominated groups close ranks around the denigrated practice, precipitating a defensive retreat into conservative cultural forms and identities” (2008, 164).
Another situation in which accommodation is warranted on Lovett's account is when individuals' subjective attachment to particular practices makes them vulnerable to exploitation. He discusses the case of Mexican immigrant laborers with limited English language skills and limited knowledge of American laws and policies. Lovett argues that extending “special public measures,” such as exceptions to general rules and regulations and public legal assistance, is required insofar as such measures would reduce the domination of these workers (2010, 260). In contrast to the communitarian or liberal egalitarian arguments considered above, the basis for the special accommodations is not a desire to protect intrinsically valuable cultures or considerations of fairness or equality but the desire to reduce domination.
Mira Bachvarova has also argued for the merits of a non-domination-based multiculturalism as compared to liberal egalitarian approaches. Because of its focus on the arbitrariness of power and the broader structural inequalities within which groups interact, a non-domination approach may be more sensitive to power dynamics in both inter-group and intra-group relations. Also, in contrast to approaches developed out of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that focus on distributing different types of rights, a non-domination approach focuses on the “moral quality of the relationship between the central actors” and insists on continuity of treatment between and within groups (2014, 671).
Other theorists sympathetic to multiculturalism look beyond liberalism and republicanism, emphasizing instead the importance of grappling with historical injustice and listening to minority groups themselves. This is especially true of theorists writing from a postcolonial perspective. For example, in contemporary discussions of aboriginal sovereignty, rather than making claims based on premises about the value of Native cultures and their connection to individual members' sense of self-worth as liberal multiculturalists have, the focus is on reckoning with history. Such proponents of indigenous sovereignty emphasize the importance of understanding indigenous claims against the historical background of the denial of equal sovereign status of indigenous groups, the dispossession of their lands, and the destruction of their cultural practices (Ivison 2006, Ivison et al. 2000, Moore 2005, Simpson 2000). This background calls into question the legitimacy of the state's authority over aboriginal peoples and provides a prima facie case for special rights and protections for indigenous groups, including the right of self-government. Jeff Spinner-Halev has argued that the history of state oppression of a group should be a key factor in determining not only whether group rights should be extended but also whether the state should intervene in the internal affairs of the group when it discriminates against particular members of the group. For example, “when an oppressed group uses its autonomy in a discriminatory way against women it cannot simply be forced to stop this discrimination” (2001, 97). Oppressed groups that lack autonomy should be “provisionally privileged” over non-oppressed groups; this means that “barring cases of serious physical harm in the name of a group's culture, it is important to consider some form of autonomy for the group” (2001, 97; see also Spinner-Halev 2012).
Theorists adopting a postcolonial perspective go beyond liberal multiculturalism toward the goal of developing models of constitutional and political dialogue that recognize culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting. Multicultural societies consist of diverse religious and moral outlooks, and if liberal societies are to take such diversity seriously, they must recognize that liberalism is just one of many substantive outlooks based on a specific view of man and society. Liberalism is not free of culture but expresses a distinctive culture of its own. This observation applies not only across territorial boundaries between liberal and nonliberal states, but also within liberal states and its relations with nonliteral minorities. James Tully has surveyed the language of historical and contemporary constitutionalism with a focus on Western state's relations with Native peoples to uncover more inclusive bases for intercultural dialogue (1995). Bhikhu Parekh contends that liberal theory cannot provide an impartial framework governing relations between different cultural communities (2000). He argues instead for a more open model of intercultural dialogue in which a liberal society's constitutional and legal values serve as the initial starting point for cross-cultural dialogue while also being open to contestation.
Some critics contend that theories of multiculturalism are premised on an essentialist view of culture. Cultures are not distinct, self-contained wholes; they have long interacted and influenced one another through war, imperialism, trade, and migration. People in many parts of the world live within cultures that are already cosmopolitan, characterized by cultural hybridity. As Jeremy Waldron argues, “We live in a world formed by technology and trade; by economic, religious, and political imperialism and their offspring; by mass migration and the dispersion of cultural influences. In this context, to immerse oneself in the traditional practices of, say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually is going on in the world” (1995, 100). To aim at preserving or protecting a culture runs the risk of privileging one allegedly pure version of that culture, thereby crippling its ability to adapt to changes in circumstances (Waldron 1995, 110; see also Appiah 2005, Benhabib 2002, Scheffler 2007). Waldron also rejects the premise that the options available to an individual must come from a particular culture; meaningful options may come from a variety of cultural sources. What people need are cultural materials, not access to a particular cultural structure. For example, the Bible, Roman mythology, and the Grimms' fairy tales have all influenced American culture, but these cultural sources cannot be seen as part of a single cultural structure that multiculturalists like Kymlicka aim to protect.
In response, multicultural theorists agree that cultures are overlapping and interactive, but they nonetheless maintain that individuals belong to separate societal cultures. In particular, Kymlicka has argued that while options available to people in any modern society come from a variety of ethnic and historical sources, these options become meaningful to us only if “they become part of the shared vocabulary of social life—i.e. embodied in the social practices, based on a shared language, that we are exposed to... That we learn...from other cultures, or that we borrow words from other languages, does not mean that we do not still belong to separate societal cultures, or speak different languages” (1995, 103). Liberal egalitarian defenders of multiculturalism like Kymlicka maintain that special protections for minority cultural groups still hold, even after we adopt a more cosmopolitan view of cultures, because the aim of group-differentiated rights is not to freeze cultures in place but to empower members of minority groups to continue their distinctive cultural practices so long as they wish to.
A second major criticism is aimed at liberal multicultural theories of accommodation in particular and stems from the value of freedom of association and conscience. If we take these ideas seriously and accept both ontological and ethical individualism as discussed above, then we are led to defend not special protections for groups but the individual's right to form and leave associations. As Chandran Kukathas (1995, 2003) argues, there are no group rights, only individual rights. By granting cultural groups special protections and rights, the state oversteps its role, which is to secure civility, and risks undermining individual rights of association. States should not pursue “cultural integration” or “cultural engineering” but rather a “politics of indifference” toward minority groups (2003, 15).
One limitation of such a laissez-faire approach is that groups that do not themselves value toleration and freedom of association, including the right to dissociate or exit a group, may practice internal discrimination against group members, and the state would have little authority to interfere in such associations. A politics of indifference would permit the abuse of vulnerable members of groups (discussed below in 3.6), tolerating, in Kukathas's words, “communities which bring up children unschooled and illiterate; which enforce arranged marriages; which deny conventional medical care to their members (including children); and which inflict cruel and ‘ununsual’ punishment” (Kukathas 2003, 134). To embrace such a state of affairs would be to abandon the values of autonomy and equality, values that many liberals take to be fundamental to any liberalism worth its name.
A third challenge to multiculturalism views it as a form of a “politics of recognition” that diverts attention from a “politics of redistribution.” We can distinguish analytically between these modes of politics: a politics of recognition challenges status inequality and the remedy it seeks is cultural and symbolic change, whereas a politics of redistribution challenges economic inequality and exploitation and the remedy it seeks is economic restructuring (Fraser 1997, Fraser and Honneth 2003). Working class mobilization tilts toward the redistribution end of the spectrum, and claims for exemption from generally applicable laws and the movement for same-sex marriage are on the recognition end. In the U.S. critics who view themselves as part of the “progressive left” worry that the rise of the “cultural left” with its emphasis on multiculturalism and difference turns the focus away from struggles for economic justice (Gitlin 1995, Rorty 1999). Critics in the United Kingdom and Europe have also expressed concern about the effects of multiculturalism on social trust and public support for economic redistribution (Barry 2001, Miller 2006, van Parijs 2004). In 2003, Phillipe van Parijs organized a conference to discuss the proposition: “Other things being equal, the more cultural... homogeneity within the population of a defined territory, the better the prospects in terms of economic solidarity” (2004, 8).
There are two distinct concerns here. The first is that the existence of racial and ethnic diversity reduces social trust and solidarity, which in turn undermines public support for policies that involve economic redistribution. For example, Robert Putnam argues that the decline in social trust and civic participation in the U.S. is strongly correlated with racial and ethnic diversity (2007). Rodney Hero has shown that the greater the racial and ethnic heterogeneity in a state, the more restrictive state-level welfare programs are (Hero 1998, Hero and Preuhs 2007). Cross-national analyses suggest that differences in racial diversity explain a significant part of the reason why the U.S. has not developed a European-style welfare state (Alesina and Glaser 2004). The second concern is that multiculturalism policies themselves undermine the welfare-state by heightening the salience of racial and ethnic differences among groups and undermining a sense of common national identity that is viewed as necessary for a robust welfare state (Barry 2001, Gitlin 1995, Rorty 1999).
In response, theorists of multiculturalism have called for and collaborated on more empirical research of these purported trade-offs. With respect to the first concern about the tension between diversity and redistribution, Kymlicka and Banting question the generalizability of the empirical evidence that is largely drawn from research either on Africa, where the weakness of state institutions has meant no usable traditions or institutional capacity for dealing with diversity, or on the U.S., where racial inequality has been shaped by centuries of slavery and segregation. Where many minority groups are newcomers and where state institutions are strong, the impact of increasing diversity may be quite different (Kymlicka and Banting 2006, 287). Barbara Arneil has also challenged Putnam's social capital thesis, arguing that participation in civil society has changed, not declined, largely as a result of mobilization among cultural minorities and women seeking greater inclusion and equality (Arneil 2006a). She argues that it is not diversity itself that leads to changes in trust and civic engagement but the politics of diversity, i.e. how different groups respond to and challenge the norms governing their society. The central issue, then, is not to reduce diversity but to determine principles and procedures by which differences are renegotiated in the name of justice (Arneil and MacDonald 2010).
As for the second concern about the tradeoff between recognition and redistribution, the evidence upon which early redistributionist critics such as Barry and Rorty relied was speculative and conjectural. Recent cross-national research suggests that there is no evidence of a systematic tendency for multiculturalism policies to weaken the welfare state (Banting et al. 2006). Irene Bloemraad's comparative study of immigrant integration in Canada and the U.S. offers support for the view that not only is there no trade-off between multiculturalism and the welfare-state but multiculturalism policies can actually increase attention and resources devoted to redistributive policies. She finds that Canada's multiculturalism policies, which provide immigrants with a variety of services in their native languages and encourage them to preserve their cultural traditions even as they become Canadian citizens, are the main reason why the naturalization rate among permanent residents in Canada is twice that of permanent residents in the U.S. Multiculturalists agree more empirical research is needed, but they nonetheless maintain that redistribution and recognition are not either/or propositions. Both are important dimensions in the pursuit of equality for minority groups. In practice, both redistribution and recognition—responding to material disadvantages and marginalized identities and statuses—are required to achieve greater equality across lines of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexuality, and class, not least because many individuals stand at the intersection of these different categories and suffer multiple forms of marginalization. A politics of recognition is important not only on account of its effects on socioeconomic status and political participation but also for the sake of full inclusion of members of marginalized groups as equal citizens.
A fourth objection takes issue with liberal multiculturalist's understanding of what equality requires. Brian Barry defends a universalist ideal of equality, in contrast to the group-differentiated ideal of equality defended by Kymlicka. Barry argues that religious and cultural minorities should be held responsible for bearing the consequences of their own beliefs and practices, just as members of the dominant culture are held responsible for bearing the consequences of their beliefs. He does think that special accommodations are owed to people with disabilities, but he believes religious and cultural affiliations are different from physical disabilities: the former do not constrain people in the way that physical disabilities do. A physical disability supports a strong prima facie claim to compensation because it limits a person's opportunities to engage in activities that others are able to engage in. In contrast, religion and culture may shape one's willingness to seize an opportunity, but they do not affect whether one has an opportunity. Barry argues that egalitarian justice is only concerned with ensuring a reasonable range of equal opportunities, not with ensuring equal access to any particular choices or outcomes (2001, 37). When it comes to cultural and religious affiliations, they do not limit the range of opportunities one enjoys but rather the choices one can make within the set of opportunities available to all.
In reply, one might agree that opportunities are not objective in the strong physicalist sense suggested by Barry. But the opportunity to do X is not just having the possibility to do X without facing physical encumbrances; it is also the possibility of doing X without incurring excessive costs or the risk of such costs (Miller 2002, 51). State law and cultural commitments can conflict in ways such that the costs for cultural minorities of taking advantage of the opportunity are prohibitively high. In contrast to Barry, liberal multiculturalists argue that many cases where a law or policy disparately impacts a religious or cultural practice constitute injustice. For instance, Kymlicka points to the Goldman case (discussed above) and other religion cases, as well as to claims for language rights, as examples in which group-differentiated rights are required in light of the differential impact of state action (1995, 108–115). His argument is that since the state cannot achieve complete disestablishment of culture or be neutral with respect to culture, it must somehow make it up to citizens who are bearers of minority religious beliefs and native speakers of other languages. Because complete state disestablishment of culture is not possible, one way to ensure fair background conditions is to provide roughly comparable forms of assistance or recognition to each of the various languages and religions of citizens. To do nothing would be to permit injustice.
Some postcolonial theorists are critical of multiculturalism and the contemporary politics of recognition for reinforcing, rather than transforming, structures of colonial domination in relations between settler states and indigenous communities. Focusing on Taylor's theory of the politics of recognition, Glen Coulthard has argued that “instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the Hegelian idea of reciprocity, the politics of recognition in its contemporary form promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonial power that indigenous peoples' demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend” (2007, 438-9; see also Coulthard 2014). There are several elements to Coulthard's critique. First, he argues that the politics of recognition, through its focus on reformist state redistributionist schemes like granting cultural rights and concessions to aboriginal communities, affirms rather than challenges the political economy of colonialism. In this regard, the politics of recognition reveals itself to be a variant of liberalism, which “fails to confront the structural/economic aspects of colonialism at its generative roots” (2007, 446). Second, the contemporary politics of recognition toward indigenous communities rests on a flawed sociological assumption: that both parties engaged in the struggle for recognition are mutually dependent on one another's acknowledgement for their freedom and self-worth. Yet, no such mutual dependency exists in actual relations between nation-states and indigenous communities: “the master—that is, the colonial state and state society—does not require recognition from the previously self-determining communities upon which its territorial, economic, and social infrastructure is constituted” (451). Third, Coulthard argues that true emancipation for the colonized cannot occur without struggle and conflict that “serves as the mediating force through which the colonized come to shed their colonial identities” (449). He employs Frantz Fanon to argue that the road to true self-determination for the oppressed lies in self-affirmation: rather than depending on their oppressors for their freedom and self-worth, “the colonized must initiate the process of decolonization by recognizing themselves as free, dignified and distinct contributors to humanity” (454). This means that indigenous peoples should “collectively redirect our struggles away from a politics that seeks to attain a conciliatory form of settler-state recognition for Indigenous nations toward a resurgent politics of recognition premised on self-actualization, direct action, and the resurgence of cultural practices that are attentive to the subjective and structural composition of settler-colonial power” (2014, 24).
Taylor, Kymlicka, and other proponents of the contemporary politics of recognition might agree with Coulthard that self-affirmation by oppressed groups is critical for true self-determination and freedom of indigenous communities, but such self-affirmation need not be viewed as mutually exclusive from state efforts to extend institutional accommodations. State recognition of self-government rights and other forms of accommodation are important steps toward rectifying historical injustices and transforming structural inequalities between the state and indigenous communities. Coulthard's analysis redirects attention to the importance of evaluating and challenging the structural and psycho-affective dimensions of colonial domination, but by arguing that indigenous peoples should “turn away” (2007, 456) from settler-states and settler societies may play into the neoliberal turn toward the privatization of dependency and to risk reinforcing the marginalization of indigenous communities at a time when economic and other forms of state support may be critical to the survival of indigenous communities.
The set of critiques that has ignited perhaps the most intense debate about multiculturalism argues that extending protections to minority groups may come at the price of reinforcing oppression of vulnerable members of those groups—what some have called the problem of “internal minorities” or “minorities within minorities” (Green 1994, Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005). Multicultural theorists have tended to focus on inequalities between groups in arguing for special protections for minority groups, but group-based protections can exacerbate inequalities within minority groups. This is because some ways of protecting minority groups from oppression by the majority may make it more likely that more powerful members of those groups are able to undermine the basic liberties and opportunities of vulnerable members. Vulnerable subgroups within minority groups include religious dissenters, sexual minorities, women, and children. A group's leaders may exaggerate the degree of consensus and solidarity within their group to present a united front to the wider society and strengthen their case for accommodation.
Some of the most oppressive group norms and practices revolve around issues of gender and sexuality, and it is feminist critics who first called attention to potential tensions between multiculturalism and feminism (Coleman 1996, Okin 1999, Shachar 2000). These tensions constitute a genuine dilemma if one accepts both that group-differentiated rights for minority cultural groups are justifiable, as multicultural theorists do, and that gender equality is an important value, as feminists have emphasized. Extending special protections and accommodations to minority groups engaged in patriarchal practices may help reinforce gender inequality within these communities. Examples that have been analyzed in the scholarly literature include conflicts over arranged marriage, the ban on headscarves, the use of “cultural defenses” in criminal law, accommodating religious law or customary law within dominant legal systems, and self-government rights for indigenous communities that reinforce the inequality of women.
These feminist objections are especially troublesome for liberal egalitarian defenders of multiculturalism who wish to promote not only inter-group equality but also intra-group equality, including gender equality. In response, Kymlicka (1999) has emphasized the similarities between multiculturalism and feminism: both aim at a more inclusive conception of justice, and both challenge the traditional liberal assumption that equality requires identical treatment. To address the concern about multicultural accommodations exacerbating intra-group inequality, Kymlicka distinguishes between two kinds of group rights: “external protections” are rights that a minority group claims against non-members in order to reduce its vulnerability to the economic and political power of the larger society, whereas “internal restrictions” are rights that a minority group claims against its own members. He argues that a liberal theory of minority group rights defends external protections while rejecting internal restrictions (1995, 35–44;1999, 31).
But many feminist critics have emphasized, granting external protections to minority groups may sometimes come at the price of internal restrictions. They may be different sides of the same coin: for example, respecting the self-government rights of Native communities may entail permitting sexually discriminatory membership rules enacted by the leaders of those communities. Whether multiculturalism and feminism can be reconciled within liberal theory depends in part on the empirical premise that groups that seek group-differentiated rights do not support patriarchal norms and practices. If they do, liberal multiculturalists would in principle have to argue against extending the group right or extending it with certain qualifications, such as conditioning the extension of self-government rights to Native peoples on the acceptance of a constitutional bill of rights.
There has been a wave of feminist responses to the problem of vulnerable internal minorities that is sympathetic to both multiculturalism and feminism (see, e.g., Arneil 2006b, Deveaux 2006, Eisenberg 2003, Phillips 2007, Shachar 2001, Song 2007, Volpp 2000). Some have emphasized the importance of moving away from essentialist notions of culture and reductive views of members of minority groups as incapable of meaningful agency (Phillips 2007, Volpp 2000). Others have sought to move from the emphasis on rights in liberal multiculturalism towards more democratic approaches. Liberal theorists have tended to start from the question of whether and how minority cultural practices should be tolerated or accommodated in accordance with liberal principles, whereas democratic theorists foreground the role of democratic deliberation and ask how affected parties understand the contested practice. By drawing on the voices of affected parties and giving special weight to the voice of women at the center of gendered cultural conflicts, deliberation can clarify the interests at stake and enhance the legitimacy of responses to cultural conflicts (Benhabib 2002, Deveaux 2006, Song 2007). Deliberation also provides opportunities for minority group members to expose instances of cross-cultural hypocrisy and to consider whether and how the norms and institutions of the larger society, whose own struggles for gender equality are incomplete and ongoing, may reinforce rather than challenge sexist practices within minority groups (Song 2005). There is contestation over what constitutes subordination and how best to address it, and intervention into minority cultural groups without the participation of minority women themselves fails to respect their freedom and is not likely to serve their interests.
The biggest challenge to multiculturalism may not be philosophical but political: a political retreat or even backlash against immigrant multiculturalism in particular. Some scholars have diagnosed a “retreat” from multiculturalism in Europe and Australia, which they attribute to a lack of public support based partly on the limited success of such policies to foster the integration of minorities (Joppke 2004, McGhee 2008). But other scholars argue there is lack of evidence of any such retreat. Based on their analysis of British policies, Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood find that legal exemptions for minority religious practices, anti-discrimination measures, and multicultural education policies remain in place, and there is no country-wide evidence suggesting that public services are no longer delivered in different languages (2013, 134). Further research is needed on whether and why there has been a retreat from multiculturalism policies.
Perhaps the claim about a “retreat” from multiculturalism has less to do with any actual changes in state policies and more with concerns about lack of social unity and increasing tensions among diverse groups in liberal democratic societies and the sense that multiculturalism is somehow to blame. Consider then-Prime Minister David Cameron's 2011 speech: “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they [young Muslims] feel they want to belong” (Cameron 2011). According to Cameron, multiculturalism stands for separation and division, not integration and unity. But the survey of different theories of multiculturalism above demonstrates that most theories of immigrant multiculturalism do not aim at separation but rather devising fairer terms of inclusion for religious and cultural minorities into mainstream society (Kymlicka 1995).
Public debate about immigrant multiculturalism should be pursued in a broader context that considers the politics of immigration, race, religion, and national security. Multiculturalism may become an easy rhetorical scapegoat for public fear and anxiety when national security is threatened and when economic conditions are bad. In Europe, concerns about the radicalization of Muslim minorities have become central to public debates about immigration and multiculturalism. This is especially true in the face of the European migration crisis as over a million people fleeing war and violence in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere have made perilous journeys by sea and land into Europe. The migration crisis has tapped into fears about terrorism and security, especially after the November 2015 Paris and July 2016 Nice attacks; it has also renewed concerns about the limits of past efforts to integrate newcomers and their descendants. Evidence from across Europe suggests that Muslims are struggling to succeed in education and the labor market in comparison to other religious and cultural minorities (Givens 2007). Socioeconomic and political marginalization interacts with immigrants' own sense of belonging: it is hard to imagine newcomers feeling integrated before they make significant steps toward socioeconomic integration. Integration is a two-way street: not only must immigrants work to integrate themselves, but the state itself must make accommodations to facilitate integration, as many multicultural theorists have emphasized. As Cecile Laborde observes, North African youth in France are “routinely blamed for not being integrated,” but this blame “confuses French society's institutional responsibility to integrate immigrants with immigrants' personal failure to integrate into society” (Laborde 2008, 208). The challenge of integrating immigrants has been heightened by increasing public acceptability of expressions of anti-Muslim sentiment. The rise of far-right political parties and their anti-Muslim publicity campaigns, coupled with the media's willingness to report, often uncritically, their positions damage the prospects for integrating Muslims in Europe (Lenard 2010, 311). Muslim political leaders report that it is “part of mainstream public dialogue” to refer to the “menace of foreign cultures and the threat posed by immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular, to social solidarity and cultural homogeneity” (Klausen 2005, 123). Muslims have been, in Laborde's words, “reduced to their presumed identity, culture, or religion, and consequently stigmatized as immigrant, Arab, or Muslim” (2008, 17). The challenges posed by integrating Muslims are thought to be more complex than the challenges of integrating earlier waves of immigrants, but as Patti Lenard argues, this alleged complexity derives from the simplistic and unfair elision between Islamic fundamentalism and the vast majority of Muslim minorities in Europe who desire integration on fairer terms of the sort that multiculturalists defend (Lenard 2010, 318).
In light of these concerns with immigrant multiculturalism, multicultural theorists need to continue to make the case that the ideal of multicultural citizenship stands for fairer terms of integration, not separation and division, and offer answers to questions such as: Why is multicultural citizenship more desirable than the traditional liberal ideal of common citizenship based on a uniform set of rights and opportunities for everyone? Are multiculturalism policies actually fostering greater integration of immigrants and their descendants? How should we think about the relationship between multiculturalism and struggles to address inequalities based on race, indigeneity, class, gender, sexuality, and disability? It is also important to study the development of multiculturalism beyond the West, including whether and how Western theories and practices of multiculturalism have traveled and been incorporated. For example, what lessons have states that only recently opened up to significant immigration, such as South Korea, drawn from the experiences of other states, and what sorts of multiculturalism policies have they adopted and why? (Lie 2014)
Ref:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/
Multiculturalism
The term multiculturalism has a range of meanings within the contexts of sociology, of political philosophy, and of colloquial use. In sociology and in everyday usage, it is a synonym for "ethnic pluralism", with the two terms often used interchangeably, for example, a cultural pluralism in which various ethnic groups collaborate and enter into a dialogue with one another without having to sacrifice their particular identities. It can describe a mixed ethnic community area where multiple cultural traditions exist (such as New York City) or a single country within which they do (such as Switzerland, Belgium or Russia). Groups associated with an aboriginal or autochthonous ethnic group and foreigner ethnic groups are often the focus.
In reference to sociology, multiculturalism is the end-state of either a natural or artificial process (for example: legally-controlled immigration) and occurs on either a large national scale or on a smaller scale within a nation's communities. On a smaller scale this can occur artificially when a jurisdiction is established or expanded by amalgamating areas with two or more different cultures (e.g. French Canada and English Canada). On a large scale, it can occur as a result of either legal or illegal migration to and from different jurisdictions around the world (for example, Anglo-Saxon settlement of Britain by Angles, Saxons and Jutes in the 5th century or the colonization of the Americas by Europeans, Africans and Asians since the 16th century).
Multiculturalism as a political philosophy involves ideologies and policies which vary widely,[1] ranging from the advocacy of equal respect to the various cultures in a society,[citation needed] through policies of promoting the maintenance of cultural diversity,[citation needed] to policies in which people of various ethnic and religious groups are addressed by the authorities as defined by the group to which they belong.[2][3]
Multiculturalism that promotes maintaining the distinctiveness of multiple cultures is often contrasted[by whom?] to other settlement policies such as social integration, cultural assimilation and racial segregation. Multiculturalism has been described as a "salad bowl" and as a "cultural mosaic"[4] - in contrast to a melting pot.[5]
Two different and seemingly inconsistent strategies have developed through different government policies and strategies. The first focuses on interaction and communication between different cultures; this approach is also often known[by whom?]as interculturalism. The second centers on diversity and cultural uniqueness, which can sometimes[quantify] result in intercultural competition over jobs (among other things) and may lead to ethnic conflict.[6][7] Discussions surrounding the issue of cultural isolation may address the ghettoization of a culture within a nation and the protection of the cultural attributes of an area or of a nation. Proponents of government policies often claim that artificial, government-guided protections also contribute to global cultural diversity.[8][not in citation given][9][need quotation to verify] The second approach to multiculturalist policy-making maintains that they[who?] avoid presenting any specific ethnic, religious, or cultural community values as central.[10][need quotation to verify]
Prevalence
In the political philosophy of multiculturalism, ideas are focused on the ways in which societies are either believed to or should, respond to cultural and religious differences. It is often associated with "identity politics", "the politics of difference", and "the politics of recognition". It is also a matter of economic interests and political power.[11] In more recent times political multiculturalist ideologies have been expanding in their use to include and define disadvantaged groups such as African Americans, LGBT, with arguments often focusing on ethnic and religious minorities, minority nations, indigenous peoples and even the disabled. It is within this context in which the term is most commonly understood and the broadness and scope of the definition, as well as its practical use, has been the subject of serious debate.
Most debates over multiculturalism center around whether or not multiculturalism is the appropriate way to deal with diversity and immigrant integration. The arguments regarding the perceived rights to a multicultural education include the proposition that it acts as a way to demand recognition of aspects of a group's culture subordination and its entire experience in contrast to a melting pot or non-multicultural societies.
The term multiculturalism is most often used in reference to Western nation-states, which had seemingly achieved a de facto single national identity during the 18th and/or 19th centuries.[12] Multiculturalism has been official policy in several Western nations since the 1970s, for reasons that varied from country to country,[13][14][15] including the fact that many of the great cities of the Western world are increasingly made of a mosaic of cultures.[16]
The Canadian government has often been described as the instigator of multicultural ideology because of its public emphasis on the social importance of immigration.[17][18] The Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalismis often referred to as the origins of modern political awareness of multiculturalism.[19] In the Western English-speaking countries, multiculturalism as an official national policy started in Canada in 1971, followed by Australia in 1973 where it is maintained today.[20][21][22][23] It was quickly adopted as official policy by most member-states of the European Union. Recently, right-of-center governments in several European states – notably the Netherlands and Denmark – have reversed the national policy and returned to an official monoculturalism.[24][unreliable source?] A similar reversal is the subject of debate in the United Kingdom, among others, due to evidence of incipient segregation and anxieties over "home-grown" terrorism.[25]Several heads-of-state or heads-of-government have expressed doubts about the success of multicultural policies: The United Kingdom's ex-Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Australia's ex-prime minister John Howard, Spanish ex-prime minister Jose Maria Aznar and French ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy have voiced concerns about the effectiveness of their multicultural policies for integrating immigrants.[26][27]
Many nation-states in Africa, Asia, and the Americas are culturally diverse and are 'multicultural' in a descriptive sense. In some, communalism is a major political issue. The policies adopted by these states often have parallels with multiculturalist policies in the Western world, but the historical background is different, and the goal may be a mono-cultural or mono-ethnic nation-building – for instance in the Malaysian government's attempt to create a 'Malaysian race' by 2020.[28]
Multiculturalism is seen by its supporters as a fairer system that allows people to truly express who they are within a society, that is more tolerant and that adapts better to social issues.[33] They argue that culture is not one definable thing based on one race or religion, but rather the result of multiple factors that change as the world changes.
Historically, support for modern multiculturalism stems from the changes in Western societies after World War II, in what Susanne Wessendorf calls the "human rights revolution", in which the horrors of institutionalized racism and ethnic cleansing became almost impossible to ignore in the wake of the Holocaust; with the collapse of the European colonial system, as colonized nations in Africa and Asia successfully fought for their independenceand pointed out the discriminatory underpinnings of the colonial system; and, in the United States in particular, with the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, which criticized ideals of assimilation that often led to prejudices against those who did not act according to Anglo-American standards and which led to the development of academic ethnic studies programs as a way to counteract the neglect of contributions by racial minorities in classrooms.[34][35]As this history shows, multiculturalism in Western countries was seen to combat racism, to protect minority communities of all types, and to undo policies that had prevented minorities from having full access to the opportunities for freedom and equality promised by the liberalism that has been the hallmark of Western societies since the Age of Enlightenment. The contact hypothesis in sociology is a well documented phenomenon in which cooperative interactions with those from a different group than one's own reduce prejudice and inter-group hostility.
C. James Trotman argues that multiculturalism is valuable because it "uses several disciplines to highlight neglected aspects of our social history, particularly the histories of women and minorities [...and] promotes respect for the dignity of the lives and voices of the forgotten.[36] By closing gaps, by raising consciousness about the past, multiculturalism tries to restore a sense of wholeness in a postmodern era that fragments human life and thought."[36]
Tariq Modood argues that in the early years of the 21st century, multiculturalism "is most timely and necessary, and [...] we need more not less", since it is "the form of integration" that (1) best fits the ideal of egalitarianism, (2) has "the best chance of succeeding" in the "post-9/11, post 7/7" world, and (3) has remained "moderate [and] pragmatic".[37]
Bhikhu Parekh counters what he sees as the tendencies to equate multiculturalism with racial minorities "demanding special rights" and to see it as promoting a "thinly veiled racis[m]". Instead, he argues that multiculturalism is in fact "not about minorities" but "is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities", which means that the standards by which the communities resolve their differences, e.g., "the principles of justice" must not come from only one of the cultures but must come "through an open and equal dialogue between them."[38]
Balibar characterizes criticisms of multiculturalism as "differentialist racism", which he describes as a covert form of racism that does not purport ethnic superiority as much as it asserts stereotypes of perceived "incompatibility of life-styles and traditions".[39]
While there is research that suggests that ethnic diversity increases chances of war, lower public goods provision and decreases democratization, there is also research that shows that ethnic diversity in itself is not detrimental to peace,[40][41]public goods provision[42][43] or democracy.[44] Rather, it was found that promoting diversity actually helps in advancing disadvantaged students.[45] A 2018 study in the American Political Science Review cast doubts on findings that ethnoracial homogeneity led to greater public goods provision.[46] A 2015 study in the American Journal of Sociology challenged past research showing that racial diversity adversely affected trust.[47]
The Wikimedia Foundation suggests that "diversity of perspectives is crucial to increasing the quality of the free knowledge resources that [their] movement provides".[48] Wikidata also suggests that "the world is complicated and there is no single truth–especially in a knowledge base that is supposed to serve many cultures."[49]
CriticismEdit
Critics of multiculturalism often debate whether the multicultural ideal of benignly co-existing cultures that interrelate and influence one another, and yet remain distinct, is sustainable, paradoxical, or even desirable.[50][51][52] It is argued that nation states, who would previously have been synonymous with a distinctive cultural identity of their own, lose out to enforced multiculturalism and that this ultimately erodes the host nations' distinct culture.[53]
Harvard professor of political science Robert D. Putnam conducted a nearly decade-long study on how multiculturalism affects social trust.[54] He surveyed 26,200 people in 40 American communities, finding that when the data were adjusted for class, income and other factors, the more racially diverse a community is, the greater the loss of trust. People in diverse communities "don’t trust the local mayor, they don’t trust the local paper, they don’t trust other people and they don’t trust institutions," writes Putnam.[55] In the presence of such ethnic diversity, Putnam maintains that:
"[W]e hunker down. We act like turtles. The effect of diversity is worse than had been imagined. And it’s not just that we don’t trust people who are not like us. In diverse communities, we don’t trust people who do look like us".[54]
Putnam has also stated, however, that "this allergy to diversity tends to diminish and to go away... I think in the long run we'll all be better."[56]
Ethnologist Frank Salter writes:
Relatively homogeneous societies invest more in public goods, indicating a higher level of public altruism. For example, the degree of ethnic homogeneity correlates with the government's share of gross domestic product as well as the average wealth of citizens. Case studies of the United States, Africa and South-East Asia find that multi-ethnic societies are less charitable and less able to cooperate to develop public infrastructure. Moscow beggars receive more gifts from fellow ethnics than from other ethnies [sic]. A recent multi-city study of municipal spending on public goods in the United States found that ethnically or racially diverse cities spend a smaller portion of their budgets and less per capita on public services than do the more homogeneous cities.[57]
Dick Lamm, former three-term Democratic governor of the US state of Colorado, wrote in his essay "I have a plan to destroy America":
Diverse peoples worldwide are mostly engaged in hating each other—that is, when they are not killing each other. A diverse, peaceful, or stable society is against most historical precedent."[58]
A number of conservative historians used the religion of the Mexica, better known as the Aztecs as an example of what they see as the flaws of multiculturalism. The Australian historian Keith Windschuttle cited the accounts of his fellow Australian historian Inga Clendinnen of the festival of Ochpaniztli where to honor the Maize Lord a young woman was sacrificed by ripping out her heart so the crops might grow:
Then, still in darkness, silence, and urgent haste, her body was flayed, and a naked priest, a 'very strong man, very powerful, very tall', struggled into the wet skin, with its slack breasts and pouched genitalia: a double nakedness of layered, ambiguous sexuality. The skin of one thigh was reserved to be fashioned into a face-mask for the man impersonating Centeotl, Young Lord Maize Cob, the son of Toci.[59]
Windschuttle argued that the gruesome religion of the Aztecs that required that dozens of young people be sacrificed and eaten every day so that the sun might rise the next day and hundreds of people sacrificed for major holidays as proving that multiculturalism is a facile doctrine that requires Westerners to respect Aztec religion as equal to any other religion.[60] The American classicist Victor Davis Hanson used the perceived differences in "rationality" between Moctezuma and Cortés to argue that Western culture was superior to every culture in the entire world, which thus led him to reject multiculturalism as a false doctrine that placed all cultures on an equal footing.[61]
In New Zealand (Aotearoa), which is officially bi-cultural, multiculturalism has been seen as a threat to the Maori, and possibly an attempt by the New Zealand Government to undermine Maori demands for self determination.[62]
ArgentinaEdit
Though not called Multiculturalism as such, the preamble of Argentina's constitution explicitly promotes immigration, and recognizes the individual's multiple citizenship from other countries. Though 97% of Argentina's population self-identify as of European descent[63][64] to this day a high level of multiculturalism remains a feature of Argentina's culture,[65][66] allowing foreign festivals and holidays (e.g. Saint Patrick's Day), supporting all kinds of art or cultural expression from ethnic groups, as well as their diffusion through an important multicultural presence in the media; for instance it is not uncommon to find newspapers[67] or radio programs in English, German, Italian, French or Portuguese in Argentina.
Bolivia is a diverse country made up of 36 different types of indigenous groups.[68] Over 62% of Bolivia's population falls into these different ingenious groups, making it the most indigenous country in Latin America.[69]Out of the indigenous groups the Aymara and the Quechua are the largest.[68] The latter 30% of the population is apart of the mestizo, which are a people mixed with European and indigenous ancestry.[69] Bolivia's political administrations have endorsed multicultural politics and in 2009 Bolivia's Constitution was inscribed with multicultural principles.[70] The Constitution of Bolivia recognizes 36 official languages besides Spanish, each language has its own culture and indigenous group.[71] Bolivian culture is celebrated across the country and has heavy influences from the Aymara, the Quechua, the Spanish, and other popular cultures from around Latin America.
The Americas have been known to be some of the most multicultural geographical locations, as many of the times there is a diversity of language, religion, and ethnicities present. The South American country Brazil can also acclaim multiculturalism, and has undergone many changes in the past few decades. Brazil is a controversial country when is comes to defining a multicultural country.[72] There are two views, in which the Harvard Institute of Economic Research states that Brazil has an intersection of many culture because of recent migration. On the other hand there is Pew Research Center, in which they state that Brazil is culturally diverse but majority of the country speaks Portuguese.[73]
With cities such as São Paulo, who are seen to be home to many migrants from Japan, Italy, and Lebanon.[74] There is a multicultural presence within in this city, and this is prevalent throughout Brazil. Furthermore, Brazil is a country who has made great strides to embrace migrant cultures, and with its increase of Afro-Descent people they have made changes to become more aware and welcoming. There has been an increase of awareness of anti-blackness and they have actively finding ways to combat racism in Brazil.[75]
Canadian society is often depicted as being "very progressive, diverse, and multicultural".[76]Multiculturalism (a Just Society[77]) was adopted as the official policy of the Canadian governmentduring the premiership of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in the 1970s and 1980s.[78] Multiculturalism is reflected in the law through the Canadian Multiculturalism Act[79] and section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[80] The Broadcasting Act of 1991 asserts the Canadian broadcasting system should reflect the diversity of cultures in the country.[81][82] Canadian multiculturalism is looked upon with admiration outside the country, resulting in the Canadian public dismissing most critics of the concept.[83][84] Multiculturalism in Canada is often looked at as one of Canada's significant accomplishments,[85] and a key distinguishing element of Canadian identity.[86][87]
In a 2002 interview with The Globe and Mail, Karīm al-Hussainī the 49th Aga Khan of the Ismaili Muslims described Canada as "the most successful pluralist society on the face of our globe", citing it as "a model for the world".[88] He explained that the experience of Canadian governance—its commitment to pluralism and its support for the rich multicultural diversity of its people—is something that must be shared and would be of benefit to all societies in other parts of the world.[88] The Economist ran a cover story in 2016 praising Canada as the most successful multicultural society in the West.[89] The Economist argued that Canada's multiculturalism was a source of strength that united the diverse population and by attracting immigrants from around the world was also an engine of economic growth as well.[89]
Mexico has historically always been a multicultural country. After the betrayal of Hernan Cortes to the Aztecs, the Spanish conquered the Aztec Empire and colonized indigenous people. They influenced the indigenous' religion, politics, culture and ethnicity.[90] The Spanish opened schools in which they taught Christianity, and the Spanish language which it eventually surpassed the indigenous dialects and languages, making it the most spoken language in Mexico. Mestizo was also born from the conquest, which meant being half-Indigenous and half-Spanish.[91] In today's world "Mestizo" has become an umbrella term to those that are non-indigenous, which would include Asian Mexicans and Afro-Mexicans.[92]
Mexico City has recently been integrating rapidly, doing much better than many cities in a sample conducted by the Intercultural Cities Index (being the only non-European city, alongside Montreal, on the index).[93] Mexico is an ethnically diverse country with a population composed of approximately 123 million in 2017.[94] There is a wide variety of ethnic groups, the major group being Mestizos followed by Indigenous Mexicans.[95] There are many other ethnic groups such as Arab Mexicans, Afro-Mexicans, Asian Mexicans and White Mexicans.
From the year 2000 to 2010, the number of people in Mexico that were born in another country doubled, reaching an amount of 961,121 people. Mostly coming from Guatemala and the United States.[96] Mexico is quickly becoming a melting pot, with many immigrants coming into the country. It is considered to be a cradle of civilization, which influences their multiculturalism and diversity, by having different civilizations influence them. A distinguishable trait of Mexico's culture is the mestizaje of its people, which caused the combination of Spanish influence, their indigenous roots while also adapting the culture traditions from their immigrants.
Peru is an exemplary country of multiculturalism, in 2016 the INEI reported a total population of 31 million people. They share their borders with Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil and Bolivia, and have welcomed many immigrants into their country creating a diverse community.
Peru is the home to Amerindians but after the Spanish Conquest, the Spanish brought African, and Asian people as slaves to Peru creating a mix of ethnic groups. After slavery was no longer permitted in Peru, African-Peruvians and Asian-Peruvians have contributed to Peruvian culture in many ways. Today, Amerindians make up 45% of the population, mestizos 37%, white 15% and 3% is composed by Black, Chinese, and others.[97] In 1821, Peru's president Jose de San Martin gave foreigners the freedom to start industries in Peru's ground, 2 years after, foreigners that lived in Peru for more than 5 years were considered naturalized citizens, which then decreased to 3 years. Which attracted Italians, Portuguese, French and German people in look for some guano for their crops.
United StatesEdit
In the United States, multiculturalism is not clearly established in policy at the federal level, but ethnic diversity is common in both rural and urban areas.
Continuous mass immigration was a feature of the United States economy and society since the first half of the 19th century.[98] The absorption of the stream of immigrants became, in itself, a prominent feature of America's national myth. The idea of the melting pot is a metaphor that implies that all the immigrant cultures are mixed and amalgamated without state intervention.[99] The melting pot theory implied that each individual immigrant, and each group of immigrants, assimilated into American society at their own pace. This is different than multiculturalism as defined above, which does not include complete assimilation and integration.[100] An Americanized (and often stereotypical) version of the original nation's cuisine, and its holidays, survived.[citation needed] The melting pot tradition co-exists with a belief in national unity, dating from the American founding fathers:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people – a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs... This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.[101]
Staff of President Clinton's One America Initiative. The President's Initiative on Race was a critical element in President Clinton's effort to prepare the country to embrace diversity. As a philosophy, multiculturalism began as part of the pragmatism movement at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States, then as political and cultural pluralism at the turn of the twentieth.[102] It was partly in response to a new wave of European imperialism in sub-Saharan Africa and the massive immigration of Southern and Eastern Europeans to the United States and Latin America. Philosophers, psychologists and historians and early sociologists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, George Santayana, Horace Kallen, John Dewey, W. E. B. Du Bois and Alain Locke developed concepts of cultural pluralism, from which emerged what we understand today as multiculturalism. In Pluralistic Universe (1909), William James espoused the idea of a "plural society." James saw pluralism as "crucial to the formation of philosophical and social humanism to help build a better, more egalitarian society.[103]
The educational approach to multiculturalism has since spread to the grade school system, as school systems try to rework their curricula to introduce students to diversity earlier – often on the grounds that it is important for minority students to see themselves represented in the classroom.[104][105] Studies estimated 46 million Americans ages 14 to 24 to be the most diverse generation in American society.[106] In 2009 and 2010, controversy erupted in Texas as the state's curriculum committee made several changes to the state's requirements, often at the expense of minorities. They chose to juxtapose Abraham Lincoln's inaugural address with that of Confederate president Jefferson Davis;[107] they debated removing Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall and labor-leader Cesar Chavez[108] and rejected calls to include more Hispanic figures, in spite of the high Hispanic population in the state.[109]
VenezuelaEdit
Venezuela is the home to a variety of ethnic groups, with an estimated population of 32 million.[110] Their population is composed of approximately 68% Mestizo, which means of mixed race.[111] Venezuelan culture is mainly composed by the mixture of their indigenous people, Spanish and African.[112] There was a heavy influence of Spaniard culture due to the Spanish Conquest, which influence their religion, language, traditions. African influence can be seen on their music, with the drum usage.[112] While Spanish is Venezuela's main language, there is more than 40 indigenous languages spoken til this day.[113]
The European Union is facing unprecedented demographic changes (an aging population, low birth rates, changing family structures and migration). According to the European Commission, it is important, both at EU and national level, to review and adapt existing policies. Following a public debate, a 2006 EU policy paper identified five key policy responses to manage demographic change, among them receiving and integrating migrants into Europe.[114]
Historically, Europe has always been a mixture of Latin, Slavic, Germanic, Uralic, Celtic, Hellenic, Illyrian, Thracian and other cultures influenced by the importation of Jewish, Christian, Muslim and other belief systems; although the continent was supposedly unified by the super-position of Imperial Roman Christianity, it is accepted that geographic and cultural differences continued from antiquity into the modern age.[115]
In the nineteenth century, the ideology of nationalism transformed the way Europeans thought about the state.[115] Existing states were broken up and new ones created; the new nation-stateswere founded on the principle that each nation is entitled to its own sovereignty and to engender, protect, and preserve its own unique culture and history. Unity, under this ideology, is seen as an essential feature of the nation and the nation-state; unity of descent, unity of culture, unity of language, and often unity of religion. The nation-state constitutes a culturally homogeneous society, although some national movements recognised regional differences.
Where cultural unity was insufficient, it was encouraged and enforced by the state.[116] The nineteenth century nation-states developed an array of policies – the most important was compulsory primary education in the national language.[116] The language itself was often standardised by a linguistic academy, and regional languages were ignored or suppressed. Some nation-states pursued violent policies of cultural assimilation and even ethnic cleansing.[116]
Some countries in the European Union have introduced policies for "social cohesion", "integration", and (sometimes) "assimilation". The policies include:
Other countries have instituted policies which encourage cultural separation.[119] The concept of "Cultural exception" proposed by France in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 1993 was an example of a measure aimed at protecting local cultures.[120]
Since its establishment in the seventh century, Bulgaria has hosted many religions, ethnic groups and nations. The capital city Sofia is the only European city that has peacefully functioning, within walking distance of 300 metres,[121][122] four Places of worship of the major religions: Eastern Orthodox (St Nedelya Church), Islam (Banya Bashi Mosque), Roman Catholicism (St. Joseph Cathedral), and Orthodox Judaism (Sofia Synagogue, the third-largest synagogue in Europe).
This unique arrangement has been called by historians a "multicultural cliche".[123] It has also become known as "The Square of Religious Tolerance"[124][125] and has initiated the construction of a 100-square-metre scale model of the site that is to become a symbol of the capital.[126][127][128]
Furthermore, unlike some other Nazi Germany allies or German-occupied countries excluding Denmark, Bulgaria managed to save its entire 48,000-strong Jewish population during World War II from deportation to Nazi concentration camps.[129][130] According to Dr Marinova-Christidi, the main reason for the efforts of Bulgarian people to save their Jewish population during WWII is that within the region, they "co-existed for centuries with other religions" – giving it a unique multicultural and multiethnic history.[131]
Consequently, within the Balkan region, Bulgaria has become an example for multiculturalism in terms of variety of religions, artistic creativity[132] and ethnicity.[133][134] Its largest ethnic minority groups, Turks and Roma, enjoy wide political representation. In 1984, following a campaign by the Communist regime for a forcible change of the Islamic names of the Turkish minority,[135][136][137][138] an underground organisation called «National Liberation Movement of the Turks in Bulgaria» was formed which headed the Turkish community's opposition movement. On 4 January 1990, the activists of the movement registered an organisation with the legal name «Movement for Rights and Freedom» (MRF) (in Bulgarian: Движение за права и свободи: in Turkish: Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi) in the Bulgarian city of Varna. At the moment of registration, it had 33 members, at present, according to the organisation's website, 68,000 members plus 24,000 in the organisation's youth wing [1]. In 2012, Bulgarian Turks were represented at every level of government: local, with MRF having mayors in 35 municipalities, at parliamentary level with MRF having 38 deputies (14% of the votes in Parliamentary elections for 2009–13)[139] and at executive level, where there is one Turkish minister, Vezhdi Rashidov. 21 Roma political organisations were founded between 1997-2003 in Bulgaria.[140]
In October 2010, Angela Merkel told a meeting of younger members of her centrist Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party[not in citation given] at Potsdam, near Berlin, that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed",[141] stating: "The concept that we are now living side by side and are happy about it does not work".[141][142] She continued to say that immigrants should integrate and adopt Germany's culture and values. This has added to a growing debate within Germany[143] on the levels of immigration, its effect on Germany and the degree to which Muslim immigrants have integrated into German society.[144] The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community of Germany is the first Muslim group to have been granted "corporation under public law status", putting the community on par with the major Christian churches and Jewish communities of Germany.[145]
LuxembourgEdit
Luxembourg has one of the highest foreign-born populations in Europe, foreigners account for nearly half of the country's total population.[146] The majority of foreigners are from: Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and Portugal.[147] In total, 170 different nationalities make up the population of Luxembourg, out of this; 86% are of European descent.[148] The official languages of Luxembourg are German, French, and Luxembourgish all of which are supported in the Luxembourg government and education system.[148][149] In 2005, Luxembourg officially promoted and implemented the objectives of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. This Convention affirms multicultural policies in Luxembourg and creates political awareness of cultural diversity.[150]
NetherlandsEdit
Süleymanìye Mosque in Tilburg built in 2001 Multiculturalism in the Netherlands began with major increases in immigration to the Netherlands during the mid-1950s and 1960s.[151] As a consequence, an official national policy of multiculturalism was adopted in the early-1980s.[151] This policy subsequently gave way to more assimilationist policies in the 1990s.[151] Following the murders of Pim Fortuyn (in 2002) and Theo van Gogh (in 2004) there was increased political debate on the role of multiculturalism in the Netherlands.[152]
Lord Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth, made a distinction between tolerance and multiculturalism, citing the Netherlands as a tolerant, rather than multicultural, society.[153] In June 2011, the First Rutte cabinet said the Netherlands would turn away from multiculturalism: "Dutch culture, norms and values must be dominant" Minister Donner said.[154]
In Serbia, there are 19 officially recognised ethnic groups with a status of national minorities.[155]Vojvodina is an autonomous province of Serbia, located in the northern part of the country. It has a multiethnic and multicultural identity;[156] there are more than 26 ethnic groups in the province,[157][158] which has six official languages.[159] Largest ethnic groups in Vojvodina are Serbs(67%), Hungarians (13%), Slovaks, Croats, Romani, Romanians, Montenegrins, Bunjevci, Rusyns.
Radio Television of Vojvodina broadcasts program in ten local languages. The project by the Government of AP Vojvodina titled "Promotion of Multiculturalism and Tolerance in Vojvodina", whose primary goal is to foster the cultural diversity and develop the atmosphere of interethnic tolerance among the citizens of Vojvodina, has been successfully implemented since 2005.[160]Serbia is continually working on improving its relationship and inclusion of minorities in its effort to gain full accession to the European Union. Serbia has initiated talks through Stabilisation and Association Agreement on 7 November 2007.
Sweden was the first country to adopt an official policy of multiculturalism in Europe. In May 1975, a unanimous Swedish parliament passed an act on a new multiculturalist immigrant and ethnic minority policy put forward by the social democratic government, that explicitly rejected the ideal ethnic homogeneity and the policy of assimilation. The three main principles of the new policy were equality, partnership and freedom of choice. The explicit policy aim of the freedom of choice principle was to create the opportunity for minority groups in Sweden to retain their own languages and cultures. From the mid-1970s, the goal of enabling the preservation of minorities and creating a positive attitude towards the new officially endorsed multicultural society among the majority population became incorporated into the Swedish constitution as well as cultural, educational and media policies. Despite the anti-multiculturalist protestations of the Sweden Democrats, multiculturalism remains official policy in Sweden.[162]
A 2008 study which involved questionnaires sent to 5,000 people, showed that less than a quarter of the respondents (23%) wanted to live in areas characterised by cultural, ethnic and social diversity.[163]
A 2014 study published by Gävle University College showed that 38% of the population never interacted with anyone from Africa and 20% never interacted with any non-Europeans.[164] The study concluded that while physical distance to the country of origin, also religion and other cultural expressions are significant for the perception of cultural familiarity. In general, peoples with Christianity as the dominant religion were perceived to be culturally closer than peoples from Muslim countries.[161]
A 2017 study by Lund University also found that social trust was lower among people in regions with high levels of past non-Nordic immigration than among people in regions with low levels of past immigration.[165] The erosive effect on trust was more pronounced for immigration from culturally distant countries.[166]
United KingdomEdit
Multicultural policies[167] were adopted by local administrations from the 1970s and 1980s onwards. In 1997, the newly elected Labour government committed to a multiculturalist approach at a national level,[168] but after 2001, there was something of a backlash, led by centre-left commentators such as David Goodhart and Trevor Phillips. The Government then embraced a policy of community cohesion instead. In 2011, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron said in a speech that "state multiculturalism has failed".[169]
MauritiusEdit
Multiculturalism has been a characteristic feature of the island of Mauritius.[170] This is mainly because of colonization that has been present from, the English, the French, and the Dutch.[171] However, the Mauritian society includes people from many different ethnic and religious groups: Hindu, Muslim and Indo-Mauritians, Mauritian Creoles (of African and Malagasydescent), Buddhist and Roman Catholic Sino-Mauritians and Franco-Mauritians (descendants of the original Frenchcolonists).[172] Mauritius has embraced intertwining of cultures from the origin of the country, and has coined the term fruit-salad, which is a much more appealing term in comparison to melting-pot showing that they were not forced to these cultures.[173]
According to the 1961 Census of India, there are 1652 indigenous languages in the country.[174] The culture of India has been shaped by its long history, unique geography and diverse demography. India's languages, religions, dance, music, architecture and customs differ from place to place within the country, but nevertheless possess a commonality. The culture of India is an amalgamation of these diverse sub-cultures spread all over the Indian subcontinent and traditions that are several millennia old.[175] The previously prevalent Indian caste system describes the social stratification and social restrictions in the Indian subcontinent, in which social classes are defined by thousands of endogamous hereditary groups, often termed jātis or castes.[176]
Religiously, Hindus form the majority, followed by Muslims. The statistics are: Hindu (80.5%), Muslim (13.4%), Christian (2.3%), Sikh (2.1%), Buddhist, Bahá'í, Jain, Jew and Parsipopulations.[177] Linguistically, the two main language families in India are Indo-Aryan (a branch of Indo-European) and Dravidian. In India's northeast, people speaking Sino-Tibetangroup of languages such as Meitei (Meitei-lon) recognized by the Indian constitution and Austroasiatic languages are commonly found. India (officially) follows a three-language policy. Hindi (spoken in the form of Hindustani) is the official federal language, English has the federal status of associate/subsidiary official language and each state has its own state official language (in the Hindi sprachraum, this reduces to bilingualism). Further, India does not have any national language.[178][179] The Republic of India's state boundaries are largely drawn based on linguistic groups; this decision led to the preservation and continuation of local ethno-linguistic sub-cultures, except for the Hindi sprachraum which is itself divided into many states. Thus, most states differ from one another in language, culture, cuisine, clothing, literary style, architecture, music and festivities.
India has encountered religiously motivated violence,[180] such as the Moplah Riots, the Bombay riots, the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, the 2002 Gujarat riots, the 2012 Assam violence, and the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. This has resulted from traditionally disadvantaged communities in public employment such as the policing of the same locality, apprehension of owners in giving properties for sale or rent[181] and of society in accepting inter-marriages.[182]
IndonesiaEdit
Pluralism, diversity and multiculturalism is a daily fact of life in Indonesia. There are over 300 ethnic groups in Indonesia.[183]95% of those are of Native Indonesian ancestry.[184] The Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia who make up nearly 42% of the total population.[185] The Sundanese, Malay, and Madurese are the next largest groups in the country.[185]There are also more than 700 living languages spoken in Indonesia[186] and although predominantly Muslim the country also has large Christian and Hindu populations.
Indonesia's national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika ("Unity in Diversity" lit. "many, yet one") enshrined in Pancasila the national ideology, articulates the diversity that shapes the country.[187] The government nurtures and promotes the diversity of Indonesian local culture; adopting a pluralist approach.
Due to migration within Indonesia (as part of government transmigration programs or otherwise), there are significant populations of ethnic groups who reside outside of their traditional regions. The Javanese for example, moved from their traditional homeland in Java to the other parts of the archipelago. The expansion of the Javanese and their influence throughout Indonesia has raised the issue of Javanization, although Minangkabau, Malay, Madurese, Bugis and Makassar people, as a result of their merantau (migrating) culture are also quite widely distributed throughout the Indonesian archipelago, while Chinese Indonesians can be found in most urban areas. Because of urbanization, major Indonesian cities such as Greater Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Palembang, Medan and Makassar have attracted large numbers of Indonesians from various ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. Jakarta in particular has almost all Indonesian ethnic groups represented.
However, this transmigration program and close interactions between people of different cultural backgrounds caused socio-cultural problems, as the inter-ethnics interactions have not always been conducted harmoniously. After the fall of Suharto in 1998 into the 2000s, numbers of inter-ethnic and inter-religious clashes erupted in Indonesia. Like the clashes between native Dayak tribes against Madurese transmigrants in Kalimantan during Sambas riots in 1999[188] and the Sampit conflict in 2001.[189] There were also clashes between Muslims and Christians, such as violence erupted in Poso between 1998 and into 2000,[190] and violences in Maluku between 1999 and into 2002.[191] Nevertheless, Indonesia today still struggles and has managed to maintain unity and inter-cultural harmony, through a national adherence of pro-pluralism policy of Pancasila; promoted and enforced by the government and its people.
Chinese Indonesians are the largest foreign-origin minority that has resided in Indonesia for generations. Despite centuries of acculturation with native Indonesians, because of their disproportionate influence on Indonesian economy, and alleged question of national loyalty, Chinese Indonesians have suffered discrimination. The Suharto Orde Baru or New Order adopted a forced assimilation policy; which indicated that Chinese cultural elements were unacceptable. Chinese Indonesians were forced to adopt Indonesian-sounding names, and the use of Chinese culture and language was banned. The violence targeting Chinese Indonesians erupted during riots in 1998. As the looting and destruction took place, a number of Chinese Indonesians, as well as looters, were killed. The Chinese Indonesians were treated as the scapegoat of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, a result of ongoing discrimination and segregation policies enforced during Suharto's New Order regime. Soon after the fourth Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid came into power in 1999, he quickly abolished some of the discriminatory laws in efforts to promote acceptance and to improve inter-racial relationships, such as abolishing the ban on Chinese culture; allowing Chinese traditions to be practised freely. Two years later President Megawati Sukarnoputri declared that the Chinese New Year (Imlek) would be marked as a national holiday from 2003.Today, Chinese Indonesians enjoy the same rights as other Indonesians.
Japanese society, with its ideology of homogeneity, has traditionally rejected any need to recognize ethnic differences in Japan, even as such claims have been rejected by such ethnic minorities as the Ainu and Ryukyuan people.[194] In 2005, former Japanese Prime Minister and current Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso described Japan as a "one civilization, one language, one culture and one race" nation.[195] However, there are "International Society" NPOs funded by local governments throughout Japan.[196]
According to Harvard University professor Theodore Bestor, Japan does look very homogeneous from a distant perspective, but in fact there are a number of very significant minority groups – ethnically different minority groups – in Japan today, such as the already mentioned Ainu and Ryukyuan people.[197]
KazakhstanEdit
Kazakhstan is among the most multicultural countries in Eurasia, with sizeable populations of ethnic Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Uighurs, Tatars, Germans and more.[198] Kazakhstan is one of a few countries in post-Soviet territories that managed to avoid interethnic clashes and conflicts in the period of USSR’s final crisis and its eventual breakup.[199] In 1995, Kazakhstan created the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, an advisory body designed to represent the country's ethnic minorities.[200]
Malaysia is a multiethnic country, with Malays making up the majority, close to 58% of the population. About 25% of the population are Malaysians of Chinese descent. Malaysians of Indian descent comprise about 7% of the population. The remaining 10% comprises:
- Native East Malaysians, namely Bajau, Bruneian, Bidayuh, Dusun, Iban, Kadazan, Kedayan, Melanau, Orang Ulu, Sarawakian Malays, etc.
- Other native tribes of Peninsular Malaysia, such as the Orang Asli and Siamese people, and
- Non-native tribes of Peninsular Malaysia such as the Chettiars, the Peranakan and the Portuguese.
The Malaysian New Economic Policy or NEP serves as a form of racial equalization.[201] It promotes structural changes in various aspects of life from education to economic to social integration. Established after the 13 May racial riots of 1969, it sought to address the significant imbalance in the economic sphere where the minority Chinese population had substantial control over commercial activity in the country.
The Malay Peninsula has a long history of international trade contacts, influencing its ethnic and religious composition. Predominantly Malays before the 18th century, the ethnic composition changed dramatically when the British introduced new industries, and imported Chinese and Indian labor. Several regions in the then British Malaya such as Penang, Malaccaand Singapore became Chinese dominated. Until the riots 1969, co-existence between the three ethnicities (and other minor groups) was largely peaceful, although the three main racial groups for the most part lived in separate communities – the Malays in the villages, the Chinese in the urban areas, and the Indians in the towns and plantation. More Malays however have moved into the cities since the 1970s, and the proportion of the non-Malays have been decreasing continually, especially the Chinese, due in large part to lower birth-rate and emigration as a result of institutionalized discrimination.[202]
Preceding independence of the Federation of Malaya, a social contract was negotiated as the basis of a new society. The contract as reflected in the 1957 Malayan Constitution and the 1963 Malaysian Constitution states that the immigrant groups are granted citizenship, and Malays' special rights are guaranteed. This is often referred to the Bumiputra policy.
These pluralist policies have come under pressure from racialist Malay parties, who oppose perceived subversion of Malay rights. The issue is sometimes related to the controversial status of religious freedom in Malaysia.
SingaporeEdit
Because of immigration, Singapore has a Chinese majority population with significant minority populations of Malays and Indians (predominantly Tamils). Other prominent smaller groups include Peranakans and Eurasians. Besides English, Singapore recognizes three other languages—Malay, Mandarin Chinese and Tamil. English was established as the medium of instruction in schools during the 1960s and 1970s and is the language of trade and government while the other three languages are taught as second languages ("mother tongues"). Besides being a multilingual country, Singapore also acknowledges festivals celebrated by the three main ethnic communities.
During British colonial rule, ethnic enclaves such as Geylang, Chinatown, and Little India were enforced. Presently (2010), remnants of colonial ethnic concentration still exist but housing in Singapore is governed by the Ethnic Integration Policy, which ensures an even ethnic distribution throughout Singapore.[203] A similar policy exists in politics as all Group Representation Constituencies are required to field at least one candidate from an ethnic minority.
South KoreaEdit
South Korea remains a relatively homogenous country ethnically, linguistically, and culturally.[204] Foreigners, expatriates, and immigrants are often rejected by the mainstream South Korean society and face discrimination.[205]
However, the word "multiculturalism" is increasingly heard in South Korea. In 2007, Han Geon-Soo, Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Kangwon National University, published an article entitled "Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic Shift in Contemporary Korea?", noting: "As the increase of foreign migrants in [South] Korea transforms a single-ethnic homogeneous [South] Korean society into multiethnic and multicultural one, [the South] Korean government and the civil society pay close attention to multiculturalism as an alternative value to their policy and social movement." He argued, however, that "the current discourses and concerns on multiculturalism in [South] Korea" lacked "the constructive and analytical concepts for transforming a society".[206]
The same year, Stephen Castles of the International Migration Institute argued:
- "Korea no longer has to decide whether it wants to become a multicultural society. It made that decision years ago – perhaps unconsciously – when it decided to be a full participant in the emerging global economy. It confirmed that decision when it decided to actively recruit foreign migrants to meet the economic and demographic needs of a fast-growing society. Korea is faced by a different decision today: what type of multicultural society does it want to be?"[207]
The Korea Times suggested in 2009 that South Korea was likely to become a multicultural society.[208] In 2010, an opinion editorial written by Peter Underwood for the JoongAng Ilbo stated: "Media in [South] Korea is abuzz with the new era of multiculturalism. With more than one million foreigners in [South] Korea, 2 percent of the population comes from other cultures." He further opined:
- "If you stay too long, Koreans become uncomfortable with you. [...] Having a two percent foreign population unquestionably causes ripples, but having one million temporary foreign residents does not make Korea a multicultural society. [...] In many ways, this homogeneity is one of Korea’s greatest strengths. Shared values create harmony. Sacrifice for the nation is a given. Difficult and painful political and economic initiatives are endured without discussion or debate. It is easy to anticipate the needs and behavior of others. It is the cornerstone that has helped Korea survive adversity. But there is a downside, too. [...] Koreans are immersed in their culture and are thus blind to its characteristics and quirks. Examples of group think are everywhere. Because Koreans share values and views, they support decisions even when they are obviously bad. Multiculturalism will introduce contrasting views and challenge existing assumptions. While it will undermine the homogeneity, it will enrich Koreans with a better understanding of themselves."[209]
Turkey is a country that borders both Europe and Asia, therefore placing it as the multicultural intersection for Eurasia – thus including people of Armenian, Jewish, Kurds, Arabs, Turks, and Persians decent. This entail influence of Hindu, Jewish, and Muslim influence leaving Turkey to be a multicultural country based on location.[210] In recent years there has been an increase of diversity acceptance in Turkey, mainly because there was fear of losing values of the non-existent Ottoman Empire.[211] However, just after the turn of the century, Turkey has embraced its multicultural location and has even began to influence other countries. With Turkey having roots of Islam they have been provided a path for Islam to be accepted into neighboring countries in Europe.[210]
United Arab EmiratesEdit
South AfricaEdit
South Africa is the fifth-most populous country and one of the most developed countries in Africa.[212] South Africa also officially recognises 11 languages including English, making it third behind Bolivia and India in most official languages.[213]The three most common languages are Zulu, Xhosa, and Afrikaans. Though South Africa's cultural traditions may decline as it becomes more and more Westernised, it is still known for its diverse culture.
Officially known as the Republic of Cameroon, Cameroon is found in central Africa consisting of a diverse geographical and cultural area that makes it one of the most diverse countries known today. Ranging from mountains, deserts, and rainforests, to coast-lands and savanna grasslands, its diverse geography makes a large diverse population possible. This diverse geography resembles Africa as a whole and due to this, most people commonly label Cameroon as “Africa in Miniature”.[214][215] Americas
Demographics and Official LanguagesEdit
Before Cameroon’s independence, it was under British and French colonial rule from 1916-1961.[215] Upon gaining sovereignty, a major colonial influence was evident, having both English and French become the national language to roughly 25,000,000 Cameroonian residents.[216][217] Apart from these two major languages, a new language consisting of a mixture of French, English, and Pidgin known as Frananglais gained popularity among Cameroonian residents.[218]
Indigenous LanguagesEdit
Although these three languages are the most common in Cameroon, there are still approximately 273 indigenous languages being spoken throughout the country, making it not only culturally diverse but linguistically as well.[219] Among those who speak these indigenous languages are people from Bantu, Sudanic, Baka, Wodaabe (or Mbororo) and even primitive hunter-gatherer groups known as Pygmies.[220][221]
Indigenous Peoples' RightsEdit
Although native to Cameroonian land, they faced constant discrimination much like other indigenous groups around the world. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the United Nations' Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. What this allowed was the protection of land and resource rights and prevented others from exploiting or violating them.[222] In 2016, a group of indigenous Baka and Bagyeli groups united to form Gbabandi. Gbabandi allowed these indigenous groups to have a form of representation and a declared list of requirements that people of Cameroon had to abide by. Among these requirements were guaranteed land rights, peoples' consent to the usage of their sacred land, traditional chiefs and the ability to participate in "local, regional, and national levels" of political and economic matters. As a result, this established a sense of justice and acknowledgment among indigenous groups in Cameroon and posed for future battles for indigenous peoples' rights.[223]
Morocco is located in Northern Africa near the Mediterranean Sea, which then connects to Europe. Morocco is a prime location for a multiculturalism, as it has much influence by neighbouring countries. Morocco has been invaded and colonised by many countries throughout the centuries, which means that they have experienced an influence of many cultures. Some of these invaders include the French, the Spaniards, the Arabs, and several more countries.[224] This has led to the country becoming not only multicultural, but also multilingual. Officially the language of Morocco is Arabic, but throughout the country many people speak, French, Spanish, Arabic, and most recently acknowledging Berber as a language.[225] There has been much outside influence of multiculturalism in Morocco, but they have embraced these cultures.[224]
AustraliaEdit
The next country to adopt an official policy of multiculturalism after Canada was Australia, a country with similar immigration situations and similar policies, for example the formation of the Special Broadcasting Service.[226] The Australian government retains multiculturalism in policy, and as a defining aspect of Australia today.[20][21][23][227]
The White Australia Policy was quietly dismantled after World War II by various changes to immigration policy, although the official policy of multiculturalism was not formally introduced until 1972.[228] The election of John Howard's Liberal-National Coalition government in 1996 was a major watershed for Australian multiculturalism. Howard had long been a critic of multiculturalism, releasing his One Australia policy in the late 1980s.[229] A Practical Reference to Religious Diversity for Operational Police and Emergency Services was a publication of the Australasian Police Multicultural Advisory Bureau designed to offer guidance to police and emergency services personnel on how religious affiliation can affect their contact with the public. The first edition was published in 1999.[230][231][232] The first edition covered Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish and Sikh faiths with participation of representatives of the various religions.[233] The second edition added Christian, Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander religions and the Bahá'í Faith to the list of religions was published in 2002.[234]
Contact between people of different cultures in Australia has been characterised by tolerance and engagement, but have also occasionally resulted in conflict and rifts.[235][236]
Australia's diverse migrant communities have brought with them food, lifestyle and cultural practices, which have been absorbed into mainstream Australian culture.[20][21]
New ZealandEdit
New Zealand is a sovereign Oceanic country that adopted its multicultural policies post World War II. The country used to have immigration policies similar to Australia's White Australia Policy,[237] but it would later follow suit with Australia in the 1970s and adopt similar multicultural policies. The relaxation of migration led to an influx of new migration to New Zealand in the 1980s.[238][239] This led to an increase of Asian and Pacific islander peoples on the island, and ultimately a more diverse European population.[240] In 1985 the Law Commission Act was passed which required the New Zealand Law Commission to review laws while taking into account both the indigenous Māori of New Zealand and New Zealand's multicultural character.[241] In 2001 the New Zealand government opened an Office of Ethnic Affairs to advise its local governments on the advancement of ethnic diversity and affairs of its multicultural communities.[241][241] In 1987 New Zealand officially recognized the indigenous Māori language as a national language.[242] The revitalization in the Māori language led to its immersion in schools and television broadcast.[243] Many landmarks on the island have both their Māori and English names officially recognized. Māori makes up 3.7% of the populations speaking language.[244] A 2013 census of New Zealand's population showed that 74% of the population identifies ethnically as European, while the latter 15% majority identify as Māori. The remainder identify as Asian, and Pacific islander.
Papua New GuineaEdit
Papua New Guinea is one of the most multicultural countries in the world.[245] This Oceanian country is home to over eight million people[246] that are divided into hundreds of different indigenous ethnic groups and cultures with over 820 different indigenous languages.[247] A majority of the indigenous groups are Papuans who have ancestors that lived in New Guinea over ten thousand years ago. The latter majority are Austronesians whose ancestors arrived less than four thousand years ago. The island's population is also made up of many expatriate citizens from China, Australia, Indonesia, Europe and the Philippines. In 1975 the island population was found to be made up of 40,000 of these diverse expatriate citizens.[248]Despite the large amount of culturally diverse locations on the island, the Kuk Early Agricultural Site is the only UNESCOWorld heritage location.[249]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism
