It is much more complex than is often portrayed by some.
This article is part of “Southeast Asia: Refugees in Crisis,” an ongoing series by The Diplomat featuring exclusive articles from scholars and practitioners tackling Southeast Asia’s ongoing refugee crisis. All articles in the series can be found here.
After over 50 years of military rule, Myanmar is finally making the
long-awaited transition to elected government. Its second liberation is
brought about by Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the opposition National
League for Democracy (NLD) and the daughter of Aung San, the man who is
known for engineering Myanmar’s first liberation from the British. Yet,
as foreign media converges on the nation, coverage in recent months has
been focused on one issue: the Rohingya.
Nicholas Kristoff’s recent article in The New York Times
begins: “Soon the world will witness a remarkable sight: a
beloved Nobel Peace Prize winner presiding over 21st-century
concentration camps.” Tens of thousands of Rohingya have been forcibly
confined in deplorable conditions in Sittwe, whilst there is evidence that
the ethnic cleansing perpetrated under the military government amounts
to genocide. In May 2015, stranded Rohingya off the coast of Thailand elicited humanitarian outrage
from the international community. Ever since, foreign commentators have
called for an end to what appears to be government inaction or lack of
accountability for extreme human rights abuses in Rakhine state.
But international attention directed at the issue – meant to hold the
government accountable –may have in fact inadvertently played a role in
exacerbating tensions between the Rohingya and the Rakhine Burmese.
Increasing resentment is bred within the Rakhine Buddhist community, who
believe the situation has been mischaracterized.
In most cases the situation has been mischaracterized. Rakhine history expert Jacques P. Leider may have put it best in his analysis Rohingya: The Name, The Movement, The Quest for Identity.
“By narrowing the debate on the Rohingyas to the legal and humanitarian
aspects, editorialists around the world have taken an easy approach
towards a complicated issue… where issues like ethnicity, history, and
cultural identity are key ingredients of legitimacy,” Leider states.
In even a cursory survey of Rohingya history, it is clear that the Rohingya are not an ethnic, but rather a political construction.
There is evidence that Muslims have been living in Rakhine state (at
the time under the Arakan kingdom) since the 9th century, but a
significant number of Muslims from across the bay of Bengal (at the time
a part of India, now Bangladesh) immigrated to British Burma with the
colonialists in the 20th century. They are, as defined by Benedict
Rogers (himself a prominent critic of the military regime’s
persecution), “Muslims of Bengali ethnic origin.” The group referred to
as “Rohingya” by contemporary Rohingya scholars (and most of the
international community) today actually display huge diversity of ethnic
origins and social backgrounds, and, as Leider argues, the existence of
a “single identity” is difficult to pinpoint.
This is not to deny the Rohingya’s claims for citizenship. This is,
however, to point out that claims to legitimacy are much more
complicated than is currently understood. As one diplomat told me: “On
all issues, the people of Myanmar are with you. But on the Rohingya
issue, the people will never be with you.” What is at the heart of this
huge gap between perspectives of the majority of Burmese and the
international community, and how does this inform making progress on
alleviating the genuine humanitarian crisis facing the Rakhine Muslims
in Sittwe?
At stake are issues of legitimacy. The international community’s use
of the term ‘Rohingya’ validates the narrative of essentializing a
Muslim identity in Rakhine state. In the most conservative terms, we can
say that scholars of Rohingya history have not understood this to
conclusively be the case. Yet, the lack of nuance with which the
international community has approached very important issues of
legitimacy has contributed to a sense that Rakhine Buddhists are
misunderstood, and besieged. On the other side of the political tension
in Rakhine state, as shown by Schissler, Walton and Phyu Thi’s “listening project” in this series, are Rakhine Buddhists who are genuinely afraid of a (false) Muslim takeover.
Myanmar remains a rumor driven society. In Kyaw Yin Hlaing’s analysis
of Buddhist misapprehension of Muslim Burmese, surveys were conducted
in seven cities in Myanmar, with 500 participants in total. It is clear
that anti-Muslim propaganda has become part of regular nationalist
discourse. Of the survey respondents, 85 percent cited fear of Muslims
turning the country Islamic as the main reason for their dislike of
Muslims. In Rakhine state, this discourse is repeated and amplified due
to the outbreaks of communal violence.
Yet, in New York Times coverage of the tensions between Muslim and Buddhist Burmese,
very few Rakhine Buddhist voices were heard. When asked why, Kristoff
replies, “The problem is the trade-offs with length… we didn’t want to
exceed 10 minutes for fear of losing viewers.” This careless portrayal
of the Rohingya’s claims to legitimacy is not just a matter of academic
nit-picking. It has real implications for humanitarian aid.
Just after the May 2015 boat crisis, there were large protests in Sittwe
– largely ignored by the rest of the world – by Rakhine Buddhists
protesting misrepresentation of the situation in Sittwe, with protestors
carrying signs like “No UN, No INGOs [international non-governmental
organizations].” Protests like this (of which
there have been many) are aimed at the international community, from
media to INGOs, and often lead to increased violence in their aftermath.
This makes it more difficult for these INGOs, as well as local NGOs, to
deliver humanitarian aid to those in Rakhine state.
For Aung San Suu Kyi to retain legitimacy where it matters most, it
is understandable that she is not outspoken on an issue that could spark
even more violence. As mentioned before, this is not simply a case of
the military government leaving Rakhine state. The NLD must aim to
resolve this crisis peacefully, which means cooperating not only with
Rakhine Muslims but also Rakhine Buddhists.
For a Buddhist, Burman-majority nation like Myanmar, it is difficult
for Aung San Suu Kyi to portray herself as a neutral arbiter. Especially
in Rakhine state, where most official positions are held by Rakhine
Buddhists, it is important that she be seen as someone understanding to
their plight – and therefore someone who can negotiate with them to
potentially seek a humanitarian alternative to the concentration camps
of Sittwe. As Aung San Suu Kyi says herself, “If you want to bring an
end to long-standing conflict, you have to be prepared to compromise.”
If she loses legitimacy with them, not only will future negotiations
on the Rohingya be closed off to her and the NLD, but the peace process
itself will come under fire for her seeming partisanship, and with it,
the entire process of building Myanmar’s democracy. What happens in
Rakhine state will be watched by the rest of the world, but it will be
felt most acutely in Myanmar.
It is important that the international community tread more carefully
in their currently unbridled calls for awareness about the Rohingya
issue. The Myanmar people are not unaware that the Muslim minority of
Rakhine state are being mistreated. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, deep
in negotiations on the peace process, are being constantly reminded of
the importance of granting appropriate rights to ethnic nationalities in
Myanmar. Myanmar will not be built in a day, nor will the camps in
Sittwe be torn down in a day. The fact that lives are on the line makes
it all the more important that we channel efforts intelligently.
Jasmine Chia is a student at Harvard University and one of the
organizers of the Refugees in Crisis series. This article was written
following research recently conducted in Yangon and Rakhine State.
Ref:http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-truth-about-myanmars-rohingya-issue/
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